Reliefs in Civil Suit: Choosing the Right Prayer based on Possession and Title

A Civil Suit with respect to an immoveable property involves consideration of several facts and circumstances, in view of which a specific relief ought to be sought by the Plaintiff, failing which the Suit could result in a dismissal despite bringing on record all the relevant facts and documents. This article captures some of the factual aspects and circumstances, in which a particular prayer has to be made in order to succeed in the Suit.

I. When there is cloud over Plaintiff’s title, a suit merely for injunction, without seeking declaration of title, is not maintainable.

In Anthula Sudhakar vs P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Ors¹ the Plaintiffs claimed to be the lawful owner of two vacant sites and filed a suit for permanent injunction in order to restrain the Defendant from interfering with their possession of the sites. However, in its Written Statement, the Defendant denied the title of the suit property in the Plaintiffs and presented himself as the rightful owner of the suit property on the basis of certain documents. The Trial Court decreed the suit, however, against the said judgment, the First Appeal filed by the Defendant was allowed, wherein the Court held that when the Defendant, in its Written Statement had set up a clear and specific case of title in himself, the Plaintiff ought to have amended the plaint to convert the suit into one for declaration and injunction. This was subsequently challenged by the Plaintiff in Second Appeal before the High Court, which allowed the same. The Defendant challenged the said judgment before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court inter alia observed that the Plaintiff in the aforesaid case was claiming title through someone who claimed to be owner in pursuance of an oral gift, without the suit property being mutated in her name, whereas the Defendant claims title from the person who was admittedly the original owner and registered in the revenue records. Therefore, the Court observed that the Defendant had prima facie made out a case of possession following title. In such circumstances, the Court held that when the Defendant in its written statement had prima facie made out a case of title in him, of the suit property, the failure of the Plaintiff to amend the Plaint and bring a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction, operated as a fatal defect. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned order and dismissed the suit.

Principles Governing where a mere suit for injunction will lie and when it is necessary to file a suit for declaration and/or possession with injunction as a consequential relief

In Anthula Sudhakar (supra) the Supreme Court observed the following principles-

Where a Plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of a property and such possession is interfered or threatened by the Defendant, a suit for an injunction simpliciter will lie. A person has a right to protect his possession against any person who does not prove a better title by seeking prohibitory injunction. But a person in wrongful possession is not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner.
Where the title of the Plaintiff is not disputed, but he is not in possession, his remedy is to file a suit for possession and seek in addition, if necessary, an injunction. A person out of possession, cannot seek the relief of injunction simpliciter, without claiming the relief of possession.
When the Plaintiff is in possession, but his title to the property is in dispute, or under a cloud, or where the Defendant asserts title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from Defendant, the Plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction. Where the title of Plaintiff is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, necessarily, the Plaintiff will have to file a suit for declaration, possession, and injunction.

When is a cloud is said to have arisen over a Person’s title?

In Anthula Sudhakar (supra) the Supreme Court clarified that a cloud is said to have arisen over a person’s title, when some apparent defect in his title to a property, or when some prima facie right of a third party over it, is made out or shown. In such a situation it is necessary to bring an action for declaration, to remove the cloud over Plaintiff’s title to the property. On the other hand, where the Plaintiff has clear title supported by documents, if a trespasser without any claim to title or an interloper without an apparent title, merely denies the Plaintiff’s title, it does not amount to raising a cloud over the title of the Plaintiff and it will not be necessary for the Plaintiff to sue for declaration and a suit for injunction may be sufficient.

However, when the Plaintiff, believing that the Defendant is only a trespasser, bereft of any document to challenge Plaintiff’s title to the property, files a suit for injunction, and in such a suit the Defendant in his Written Statement, makes out a case of prima facie title in him, then there is a need for the Plaintiff to amend the Plaint and convert the suit into one for declaration and injunction. Alternatively, he may withdraw the suit for bare injunction, with permission of the Court to file a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. The Court also clarified that a suit for declaration and injunction would be maintainable even if the same has been filed after the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue of possession and not any issue of title. The Court also emphasized that a Plaintiff having a lawful title over the property, should not be made to exercise the costlier course of filing a suit for declaration and injunction instead of a suit for injunction simpliciter, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon Plaintiff’s property. In such cases the Court should exercise its discretion carefully.

In Jharkhand State Housing Board vs Didar Singh & Ors² the Plaintiff filed a suit for injunction against the Defendant, who, in its Written Statement disputed the title of the Plaintiff by relying upon cogent evidence. The Trial Court however, decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiff and injuncted the Defendant from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff. The matter finally reached Supreme Court in Appeal, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that a suit for mere injunction does not lie when the Defendant raises genuine dispute with regard to the title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the Plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, Plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction.

The Court, however, clarified that not in every case, where the Defendant disputes the title of the Plaintiff, it is necessary to seek relief of Declaration. Such a relief is only required to be sought, along with injunction, only when the Defendant raises a genuine dispute with respect to Plaintiff’s title. Therefore, it is imperative for the Court to examine whether the cloud raised over Plaintiff’s title, by the Defendant, is genuine or frivolous.

II. Plaintiff can seek Declaration of Title without seeking Cancellation of Sale Deed executed by another party

At the heart of this issue lies interpretation of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 [“the Act”] which provides the remedy of ‘cancellation’ which can be exercised by ‘any person’ against whom a written instrument has been executed which is void or voidable. In Hussain Ahmed Choudhary & Ors. vs Habibur Rahman (Dead) through LRs. And Ors³, the Plaintiff had come in possession of the suit property by way of a registered gift deed executed in his favour. However, subsequently, a sale deed was executed by Defendants in favour of Respondent No.1, selling a part of the suit land. It was Plaintiff’s case that the Defendants did not have any title or saleable rights over the suit property. Therefore, the Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, recovery of possession, mandatory injunction over the suit land against the Defendants. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court allowed the Suit, however, the High Court, in second Appeal, dismissed the suit, allowing the Appeal, on the ground that in absence of a challenge to the subsequent sale deed and omission on the part of the Plaintiff to seek consequential relief of cancellation of the sale deed, the Plaintiff would be disentitled from obtaining a decree declaring his right, title and interest over the suit property.

In Appeal before the Supreme Court, the Court noted that the Plaintiff is a stranger to the subsequent sale deed, executed by the Defendants in favour of Respondent No.01, with respect to the suit property. Therefore, in such a scenario, the Plaintiff, by no stretch of imagination, can fall under “Any person” in Section 31 of the Act. The Court explained that where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed under Section 31 of the Act. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The Court further explicated as follows-

“29. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to ‘A’ and ‘B’ ─ two brothers. ‘A’ executes a sale deed in favour of ‘C’. Subsequently ‘A’ wants to avoid the sale. ‘A’ has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if ‘B’, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by ‘A’ is invalid/void and non est/ illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence, both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding.

30. As observed aforesaid, a Plaintiff who is not a party to a decree or a document, is not obligated to sue for its cancellation. This is because such an instrument is neither be likely to affect the title of the Plaintiff nor be binding on him.” (emphasis supplied)

The Plaintiff in the present case was not the executant of the subsequent sale deed and nor was he a party to it, therefore, he was not obligated to seek cancellation of the sale deed and a suit for declaration of his title and possession was sufficient. The Court also cogitated upon, whether the Plaintiff ought to have also sought a declaration to the effect that the sale deed not binding upon him and concluded that a suit for declaration of title is as good as a relief of cancellation. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal, set aside the judgment rendered by the High Court, and affirmed the judgment of Trial Court and First Appellate Court.

III. When Plaintiff is not in possession of Suit Property, a suit for declaration simpliciter is not maintainable and a prayer for consequential relief of possession, as per Section 34, must also be sought.

Section 34 of the Act provides declaratory relief to a party who is entitled to a right or status. The proviso to the aforesaid section operates as a bar when the Plaintiff, in furtherance of the declaratory relief sought in his Plaint, fails to seek a consequential relief, flowing from the declaration-

“Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the Plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.”

The object of the aforesaid proviso is to curb multiplicity of litigation and is intended to ensure that the Suits instituted before the Courts are complete in all respects and the prayers are such that the dispute between the parties is brought to quietus⁴.

In Vinay Krishna vs Keshav Chandra & Ors⁵ the Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration with respect to his properties mentioned in a compromise decree reached between the parties in earlier proceedings. The Defendants in their written statement raised plea that the Plaintiff was not in possession of the Suit properties and therefore, the relief is barred by Section 34 of the Act as the Plaintiff failed to seek consequential relief of possession, flowing from declaration. The Supreme Court inter alia observed that when the Defendants raised the bar of Section 34, the Plaintiff ought to have amended the Plaint and included relief of possession also, which the Plaintiff failed to do and chose to take a risk. In such circumstance, Section 34 bars the discretion of the Court in granting the decree of Declaration.

IV. When the Vendor, after executing an Agreement to Sell with the Plaintiff with respect to the suit property, executes another agreement with third parties, selling the suit property to them, Plaintiff need not seek cancellation of subsequent sale deed and only seek specific performance of the Suit Agreement.

In the aforesaid factual scenario, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the Contract between the vendor and the Plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resided in him to the Plaintiff⁶. In Maharaj Singh & Ors. vs Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. LRs & Ors.⁷ the Defendant executed an Agreement to Sell, by way of which he agreed to sale the Suit Property to the Plaintiff, subject to payment of the balance consideration at the time of execution of the Sale deed. However, subsequently, the Defendant sold the Suit properties to other Defendants/third parties by executing separate Agreement to Sell. Thereafter the Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of the Agreement executed between him and the vendor/Defendant No.01. The Defendants argued that Plaintiff is not entitled to the decree of specific performance since he failed to add a prayer for cancellation of the subsequent sale deed. The Supreme Court relied upon the decision rendered by the three-judge bench in the matter of Lala Durga Prasad and Anr. vs vs Lala Deep Chand and Ors⁸ and held that in such a scenario the subsequent purchasers can be directed to execute the sale deed with the original vendor and there is no necessity to pray for the cancellation of the subsequent sale deeds.

V. In absence of a Prayer for Declaratory relief that termination/cancellation of the Agreement is bad in law, a suit for specific performance is not maintainable.

The aforesaid proposition is founded on the principle that a valid agreement is a sine qua non for grant of relief of specific performance. When an Agreement is terminated, it is incumbent upon the Plaintiff, seeking specific performance of the said Agreement to also seek a declaration to the effect that the termination of the Agreement by the Defendant was illegal, for it is only after the determination of valid/invalid termination of the Agreement, the Court can proceed to grant or refuse to grant the decree of specific performance. For a detailed consideration of this issue, refer here. In Sangita Sinha vs Bhawna Bharwaj & Ors.⁹ the Plaintiff entered into an Agreement to Sell with the Defendant for purchase of the Suit Property. However, subsequently, the Defendant terminated the said agreement. The Plaintiff filed a Suit for Specific Performance of the Agreement to Sell. The Trial Court decreed the suit and the Appeal against the said judgment was dismissed by the High Court. Before Supreme Court, the Court held that it was incumbent upon the Respondent No.01-buyer to seek declaratory relief that the said cancellation is bad in law and not binding on parties for the reason that existence of a valid agreement is sine qua non for the grant of relief of specific performance. In absence of the declaratory relief, the Court held that the Suit for Specific Performance was not maintainable and set aside the judgments of the Courts below.

VI. Damages in lieu of Specific Performance can only be granted when the Suit for Specific Performance is decreeable. If Plaintiff abandons his claim for Specific Performance, then Damages, in lieu thereof, cannot be granted.

When a Contract is breached or terminated by the Defendant, the Plaintiff has the following two remedies to elect-

He can file a suit for specific performance of the Agreement and seek damages in addition to or in lieu thereof;
He can sue for damages and treat the contract at an end and himself discharged from his obligations.

In the case of the former, it is imperative for the Plaintiff to plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations not only up till the filing of the suit but at all times, from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency of the suit¹⁰. However, in the case of latter, i.e. a suit for damages, the Plaintiff is not required to show his readiness and willingness as he treats himself discharged from the contract owing to breach by Defendant or Termination of the Agreement. Both the cases stand on different footing. Claim for damages under Section 73 of the Contract Act is an entirely different cause of action¹¹.

In Gopi Nath Sen & Ors v Bahadurmal Dulichand¹², the Plaintiff filed a Suit for Specific Performance of the Agreement, however, during the Trial, the Plaintiff abandoned the claim for specific performance and stated he wants damages instead. The High Court observed that once the suit for Specific Performance fails, by reason of the fact that claim for specific performance was not pressed or abandoned during the trial, the question of damages in lieu of Specific Performance also fails.

In Board of Control for Cricket in India vs Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd.¹³, the Bombay High Court was hearing a challenge to the Arbitral Award in favour of the Claimant/DCHL. With respect to the damages awarded to the Claimant/DCHL, the Court observed that during the arguments before the Tribunal, DCHL abandoned its claim for specific performance and Tribunal still awarded damages to DCHL in lieu of Specific Performance despite there being no specific prayer made by DCHL for damages in lieu of Specific Performance. The Court further observed that in order to grant damages in lieu of Specific Performance, the following elements had to be present-

A prayer for specific performance;
A prayer for damages in lieu of specific performance;
A finding returned that DCHL was entitled to specific performance;
A further finding returned that specific performance was rendered impossible, though sought; and
Therefore, damages were awarded in lieu of specific performance, as sought in claim.

Applying the aforesaid elements to the facts of the present case, the Court observed as follows-

“246. Item (b) does not exist, and no amendment was sought to that effect. All that the Award does is (d). It does not address the lack of a prayer (item (b) above), nor does it consider items (c) or (e). There is no finding of readiness and willingness, and no discussion of any proof of it. The Award does not return a finding of DCHL being entitled, on any reasoning or appreciation of evidence, to specific performance. If (b) did not exist, no damages could be granted in those terms, i.e. in lieu of specific performance. Even if (b) existed, once (a) was given up and not pressed, (b) could not be granted; and no Court or arbitrator could proceed to (c), (d) or (e).”

In view of the above the Court held that by awarding damages in lieu of specific performance, the Tribunal awarded a claim for which there was no prayer made by the Claimant and granted a relief that was never sought.

Therefore, in order to seek damages in lieu of specific performance, it is imperative for the Plaintiff to not abandon its claim for specific performance. If the Plaintiff chooses to do so then he must amend the Suit and bring a claim solely for damages which would have to be adjudicated by keeping different principles in mind without addressing the issue of readiness and willingness of the Plaintiff as in the case of a claim for specific performance.

VII. When the Transfree does not pay the entire or balance consideration with respect to the immovable property despite registration of sale deed in his favour then Plaintiff/transferor is only entitled to statutory charge over the property to the extent of unpaid consideration, a suit for cancellation of sale deed would not be maintainable.

The Registration of the Agreement to Sell with respect to an immovable property marks the final act in the process of transfer of property, pursuant to which the property stands transferred in the name of the transferee. At this point, even if the transferee has not paid the balance consideration to the transferor/vendor, that does not entitle the transferor/vendor to retain possession of the suit property against the transferee. This position of law can be culled out from Section 54 and Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. For a detailed consideration of this issue, refer here.

Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines “Sale” as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised which indicates that payment of whole of the price at the time of execution of sale deed is not a sine qua non to the completion of sale. Even if whole of the price is not paid but the document is executed and thereafter registered, if the property is of value of more than Rs 100, the sale would be complete¹⁴. Furthermore, Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, inter alia stipulates that where the ownership of the property is transferred to the buyer before payment of the whole of the sale price, the vendor is entitled to a charge on that property for the amount of the sale price as also for interest thereon from the date of delivery of possession. The charge does not entitle the seller to retain possession of the property as against the buyer but positively gives him a right to enforce the charge by suit¹⁵.

In Dahiben vs Arvind Bhai Kalyanji Bhanushali¹⁶, The Plaintiff sold the property to the Respondent No. 1 by way of registered sale deed, who in turn, sold the property to Respondent No. 2 and 3. Later the Plaintiff brought a suit against the Respondents for cancellation of Sale deed in favour of Respondent No. 1 on the account of non-payment of entire consideration by the Respondent No. 1. The Supreme Court held that even if the whole price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the title would pass on the transferee under the transaction. The non-payment of a part of the price would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the property is already passed, even if the balance consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. The Court emphasised that even if the averments of the Plaintiff are taken to be true, that the entire sale consideration had in fact not been paid, it could not be a ground for cancellation of the sale deed.

VII. When Sale deed/Document is void, Plaintiff need not seek declaratory relief or cancellation of the Sale deed. Suit for possession simpliciter is maintainable.

When a document is void-ab-initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eyes of law, as it would be a nullity¹⁷. It is necessary to strategically choose a prayer for declaratory relief or cancellation of a document as the limitation period for seeking the aforesaid claims is 3 years as per Article 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, respectively, as opposed to a prayer for recovery of possession which is governed by Article 65, stipulating a 12 year limitation period which is computed from the date the possession of the Defendant becomes adverse to the Plaintiff. Therefore, in a given facts and circumstances, if a Defendant has occupied possession of the Suit property on the basis of void documents, a suit for recovery of possession simpliciter is maintainable and the Plaintiff is not required to seek cancellation of sale deed or declaratory relief that the sale deed is void.

In kewal Kishan vs Rajesh Kumar and Ors ¹⁸ the Defendant sold the Suit Properties to his son and wife by way of Power of Attorney which is not recognized as valid mode of transferring rights in the immovable property, rendering the transaction void-ab-initio. Plaintiff filed suit for injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with his possession of the suit property and in the alternative sought a decree of possession. The Supreme Court held that since the sale deeds were executed by way of Power of Attorney therefore, it was a sham transaction and in such circumstances the Plaintiff is not required to seek declaratory relief that the sale deed is void and the suit would not be governed by the limitation period of three years applicable to declaratory relief. However, the Court added that pleadings must be present in the Plaint that the sale deed is void. This ratio was followed by Supreme Court in the matter of Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through LRs vs Jagan Devi¹⁹ wherein the Defendant executed a sale deed which was found to be void as the Plaintiff did not receive any consideration against it. Since the property was sold on the basis of void document, the Supreme Court held that the Plaintiff is not required to seek cancellation of sale deed and the suit for possession simpliciter would be maintainable for which limitation period is 12 years.

A situation could arise wherein in a suit with respect to a void transaction the Plaintiff has sought declaratory relief as well as claim for recovery of possession. Could it be said that in that case the Suit would be governed by Article 58 stipulating a limitation period of three years, for declaration and not Article 65, stipulating period of 12 years, for recovery of possession? In State of Maharashtra vs Pravin Jethalal Kamdar²⁰ the State had taken over possession of the property of the Plaintiff by exercising its right under Section 27(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regularization Act, 1976) pursuant to which the Plaintiff executed sale deed of the suit property in favour of the State/Defendant. However, in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Bhim Singhji vs Union of India²¹, the action taken by the State under Section 27(1) was declared invalid, resulting in the sale of property by the Plaintiff to the State/Defendant, a nullity/void. Therefore, Suit was filed by the Plaintiff seeking declaratory relief along with recovery of possession. The State opposed the suit on the ground that the suit would be governed by three years limitation period for declaratory relief and since the said period had elapsed the suit is barred by limitation. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the prayer for declaratory relief would be of no consequence as the case pertains to a void transaction and the suit would be governed by Article 65, for recovery of possession, stipulating a limitation period of 12 years. Since the suit was filed within the aforesaid period, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court decreeing the suit for possession.

Distinction between Void and Voidable Document

Limitation period of three years for suit for Cancellation of document and Declaratory relief, is not attracted when the document in question is void. However, if the document is voidable, then limitation period would be applicable and the party would not be excused from seeking the declaratory relief/cancellation in that case. In Dulari Devi vs Janardan Singh & Ors²² the Supreme Court held that a “voidable” document continues to be in force until it is set aside by a competent court. Article 59 of limitation Act, 1963 applies when a document is prima facie valid, however it does not apply when the document is presumptively invalid²³. Therefore, it is imperative to discern whether the document in question is void or voidable. In Ningawwa vs. Byrappa²⁴ the Supreme Court held that when there is fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document, then in that case the transaction is void. However, when there is a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents of the document, then the transaction is voidable. This position of law was quoted with approval by Supreme Court recently, in Khursheed & Anr. vs Shaqoor²⁵.

IX. When composite suit has been filed for cancellation of sale deed and of possession, the limitation period would have to be adjudged from the primary relief of cancelation which is 3 years and not the ancillary relief of possession which is 12 years.

In Rajpal Singh vs Saroj (Deceased) Through LRs and Anr.²⁶, the Plaintiff filed a Suit for cancellation of registered sale deed and recovery of possession. The sale deed was registered in the year 1996 and the suit was filed in the year 2007. The Plaintiff contended that the suit would be governed by the period of 12 years for recovery of possession, however, the Supreme Court held that the relief for possession is a consequential prayer and the substantive prayer was of cancellation of the sale deed registered in the year 1996, therefore, the limitation is required to be considered with respect to the substantive relief claimed and not the consequential relief. Limitation period of three years for cancellation of sale deed elapsed in the year 1999 and the suit was filed in the year 2007, therefore the Supreme Court held that Suit is barred by limitation.

The above ratio was followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajeev Gupta & Ors. vs Prashant Garg & Ors.²⁷ wherein the Plaintiff had filed Suit in the year 2003 for cancellation of registered sale deed executed in the year 1992 and also sought consequential relief of recovery of possession and injunction. However, later, the Plaintiff dropped the prayer for cancellation and only sought recovery of possession. The Supreme Court reiterated the ratio laid down in Rajpal Singh (supra) and empahsised that when a composite suit is filed the limitation period would be governed by the primary relief i.e. cancellation, in the present case, providing limitation period of three years which elapsed in the year 1995, however, the suit was filed by the Plaintiff in the year 2003, rendering it barred by limitation.

Conclusion

Therefore, to encapsulate, the following table may be referred-

S.N.	Factual Circumstances	Remedy
1.	Plaintiff is in lawful possession of the property and such possession is interfered by the Defendant.	Suit for injunction simpliciter.
2.	Title of the Plaintiff is not disputed, but he is not in possession of the property. (adverse possession)	Suit for recovery of possession and injunction. Injunction simpliciter will not be maintainable in this case.
3.	Plaintiff is in possession, however, a cloud is raised over his title by the Defendant.	Suit for declaration and injunction. Injunction simpliciter will not be maintainable in this case.
4.	Plaintiff is not in possession of the Suit property and a cloud is raised over his title by the Defendant.	Suit for recovery of possession, declaration of title and injunction.
5.	Plaintiff filed suit for injunction, however, the Defendant in its Written Statement disputed the title of the Plaintiff by relying upon cogent evidence.	Plaintiff must amend the suit and include the relief of declaration along with injunction. He may even withdraw the suit and file a comprehensive suit for declaration and injunction. A suit for declaration and injunction would be maintainable even if the same has been filed after the suit for injunction is dismissed, where the suit raised only the issue of possession and not any issue of title²⁸.
6.	Plaintiff filed suit for injunction, however, the Defendant, in his Written Statement, merely disputed the title of the Plaintiff without any cogent evidence.	It is not necessary for the Plaintiff to seek declaration and a Suit for Injunction simpliciter will suffice. Only when the Defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title, then a suit for injunction simpliciter would not be maintainable²⁹.
7.	Plaintiff is lawful owner of the Suit Property, however the Suit Property is sold by way of sale deed by a person having no authority, in favour of another person.	Plaintiff can file a suit for declaration of his title. A declaration of title is as good as a relief of cancellation of the sale deed. He is not obligated to seek cancellation of the sale deed as he is a complete stranger to it, he is neither the executant of the sale deed nor party to it³⁰.
8.	Plaintiff is not in possession of the Suit Property. He files a suit for declaration in which the Defendants raised the plea of bar under Section 34 of the Act, as Plaintiff failed to seek consequential relief of possession.	Amend the Plaint and include the relief of recovery of possession. Section 34 bars declaratory relief if the Plaintiff fails to seek consequential reliefs flowing from declaration³¹.
9.	Plaintiff entered into Agreement to Sell with the Vendor for purchasing his Suit Property. However, after execution of the Agreement, the Vendor sold the Suit Property to another party by executing a separate Agreement to Sell.	Suit for specific performance of the Agreement entered into between Plaintiff and the Vendor. There is no necessity to seek cancellation of subsequent sale deed³². The proper form of decree in this case is to direct specific performance of the Contract between the vendor and the Plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resided in him to the Plaintiff³³.
10.	When the Agreement is cancelled/terminated by the Defendant and the Plaintiff wants specific performance of the Agreement.	Suit for Specific Performance along with a prayer of declaratory relief that the termination of the Agreement was illegal or bad in law. In absence of declaratory relief, Suit for Specific Performance is not maintainable³⁴.
11.	Plaintiff filed suit for specific performance and also sought damages in addition to or in lieu of the claim for specific performance.	In order to succeed in its claim, it is imperative for the Plaintiff to not abandon the prayer for specific performance. If during trial, the Plaintiff abandons the claim for specific performance and only presses for damages, then the suit would not be maintainable³⁵. If the Plaintiff, at all, wishes to drop the claim for specific performance then it must only be done by way of an amendment to only bring a claim for damages for breach of contract.
12.	When the Tansfree does not pay the balance consideration with respect to the immovable property despite registration of the sale deed	Suit for enforcement of charge under Section 55(4)(b) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to the extent of unpaid consideration. A suit for cancellation of sale deed would not be maintainable as once the sale deed is registered; the title passes on to the transferee and the vendor/transferor is only entitled to a statutory charge over the property as per Section 55(4)(b)³⁶.
13.	When sale transaction takes place on the basis of a void sale deed.	Suit for recovery of possession simpliciter is maintainable. Since the sale deed is void, the Plaintiff is not required to seek declaratory relief or cancelation of sale deed. Suit would be governed by Article 65 of Limitation Act (12 years limitation period) and not Article 58 or 59 of Limitation Act (3 years limitation period)³⁷.
14.	When sale transaction takes place on the basis of a void sale deed and the Plaintiff has filed suit for recovery of possession along with declaratory relief.	Suit would continue to be governed by Article 65 for recovery of possession, providing limitation period of 12 years. Since sale deed is void, prayer for declaratory relief would be of no consequence and the suit would not be governed by Article 58 providing 3 years limitation period³⁸.
15.	When a composite suit is filed for cancellation of sale deed and of Recovery of possession	The limitation period would be governed by the primary relief of cancellation (3 years) and not the ancillary relief of possession (12 years). Suit filed beyond the period of three years would be time barred³⁹.

By Daksh Pandit